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Abstract
Cryptography is the science and art of keeping information secret to un-intended
parties. But, how can we determine who is an intended party and who is not?
Authentication is the branch of cryptography that aims at conrming the source of
data or at proving the identity of a person. This Ph.D. thesis is a study of dierent
ways to perform cryptographic authentication of data and users.
The main contributions are contained in the six papers included in this thesis and
cover the following research areas: (i) homomorphic authentication; (ii) server-aided
verication of signatures; (iii) distance-bounding authentication; and (iv) biometric
authentication. The investigation ow is towards collaborative settings, that is,
application scenarios where dierent and mutually distrustful entities work jointly
for a common goal. The results presented in this thesis allow for secure and ecient
authentication when more entities are involved, thus the title \be more and be
merry".
Concretely, the rst two papers in the collection are on homomorphic authenticators
and provide an in-depth study on how to enhance existing primitives with multi-
key functionalities. In particular, the papers extend homomorphic signatures and
homomorphic message authentication codes to support computations on data au-
thenticated using dierent secret keys. The third paper explores signer anonymity
in the area of server-aided verication and provides new secure constructions. The
fourth paper is in the area of distance-bounding authentication and describes a
generic method to make existing protocols not only authenticate direct-neighbors,
but also entities located two-hop away. The last two papers investigate the leakage
of information that aects a special family of biometric authentication systems and
how to combine veriable computation techniques with biometric authentication in
order to mitigate known attacks.
Keywords: Homomorphic Signatures, Server-Aided Verication, Veriable Com-
putation, Distance-Bounding Authentication Protocols, Biometric Authentication.
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Introduction
Man is by nature a social animal; an individual who is
unsocial naturally and not accidentally is either beneath
our notice or more than human.
Aristotle, Politics
The social nature of human beings renders communicating and storing information
two essential needs for surviving. Knowing where to go, who people are, asking for
clarications and providing instructions is something we do everyday. In developed
countries, the society has taken a digital approach: people `talk' to each other
in chats, e-mails or video-calls; and save information they want to `remember' on
smartphones or cloud back-ups. The migration to digital platforms has increased the
demand for digital interaction and storage methods that achieve features similar to
or better than face-to-face conversations and personal memory. Common concerns
are: how can we be sure of the identity of our digital interlocutor, does someone
else know what we are talking about; or what guarantees the stored data are always
available to us only and not modied without us noticing? Cryptography addresses
these and more concerns by keeping information secret to un-intended receivers and
allowing secure communication in the presence of untrusted parties [47].
The Cryptographers' World
My parents' generation grew up having face-to-face as the most common way to
communicate. For them it was clear who they were talking to and where and when
the conversation was taking place. Thus, my parents could easily adjust the content
and style of the conversation according to the circumstance. If they had to discuss
something private or secret, they would ask to meet in a remote location, or in a
place surrounded by people that had no interest in their secret. They would use
letters or wired telephones to contact people who were far-away. In the rst case,
they would not know whether the letter reached its destination until they received
a response (and recognized the sender's handwriting); in the second case, they were
extremely suspicious on who was listening inside the telephone line, but still they
were happy they could recognize the interlocutor by hearing their voice. Important
information was either learned by heart or written on a piece of paper they would
hide somewhere safe to make sure no-one would access it.
My generation is quite dierent. We were born with modern computers and
digital technologies. We are used to asynchronous communications via e-mail and
to instant messaging in social networks. Our most common way of communicating is
in virtual environments. In particular, we almost never see or hear our interlocutors
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♫
REALITY
?
THE CRYPTOGRAPHERS’ WORLD
EveMallory BobAlice
Figure 1: Quirky representation of some dierences between the real - and the cryp-
tographers' (perception of the) world.
in real time and have no way to determine when and where a piece of information is
delivered or received. Regarding sensitive data, we may try to learn it by heart, but
it is so much easier and handier to store it on our smartphones, computers or directly
in the cloud! Therefore, in contrast to my parents, I nd it very hard to know for
sure who I am writing to, to adjust the content and style of my conversations or to
make sure no-one can nd my secret data. However, I would still like to have the
same guarantees as my parents had. This is what cryptography tries to achieve.
In a nutshell, the cryptographer's world is looking at our digital world with some
privacy-paranoid glasses, as guratively depicted in Figure 1. In cryptography, the
talking entity magically becomes Alice and has an urge to communicate highly sen-
sitive information to another person, named Bob, who is located far, far away from
her. Everyone around them turns into an evil being, Eve or Mallory according to
the story, and is suspiciously interested in the content of Alice and Bob's conversa-
tion. This setting is formalized in the concept of communication over an insecure
channel.
Investigating how paranoid the cryptographers' world can be is a Ph.D. on its
own and falls outside the scope of this thesis. During my Ph.D., I regarded the
cryptographers' view of the world as fascinating and immersed myself in it with the
objective to develop some tools that would render it a brighter reality. To this aim,
I collect in this thesis new proposals for data and user authentication. Concretely,
the presented contributions can be used to ensure Alice that she is talking to Bob
and not to Eve, and that her data have not been modied by Mallory.
The Main Security Goals of Cryptography
Cryptographic primitives and protocols are designed to maintain a desired set of
security goals even under attempts at making them deviate from the expected func-
tionality. We briey describe the two most common security goals in the paragraphs
below [81] assuming that an entity called Alice wants to communicate with another
entity called Bob in the presence of an undesired party called, generically, the ad-
versary.
Condentiality. This is the main idea people associate to the term \Cryptog-
raphy". In a nutshell, if a cryptographic scheme or protocol achieves condentiality
it means that Alice is able to send messages to Bob in such a way that only Bob
can read the messages and no adversary is able to see the actual content of their
communication. Encryption is the queen cryptographic primitive for condentiality.
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Authentication. This property can refer to both data and user authentica-
tion. In the case of user authentication, this functionality ensures that a certain
person, e.g., Alice, is who she claims to be. For message authentication, the goal
is to provide some additional information that guarantees to Bob that the mes-
sage he received was originated by Alice. In particular, no undesired third party
should be able to impersonate Alice. Digital signatures and Message Authentica-
tion Codes (MAC) are the two knights cryptographic primitives that grant data
authentication. Regarding user authentication, in this thesis we consider the case
of distance-bounding and biometric protocols.
Condentiality and authentication are the two main security goals of cryptogra-
phy, however, there are other useful functionalities that cryptographic primitives
and protocols can guarantee, such as: integrity [9], non-repudiation [27], controlled
malleability [44], redactability [24], delegation [61], attribute-based condentiality
[50], proofs of knowledge [76], availability and proofs of work [55], and more. This
Ph.D. thesis focuses on authentication and data integrity.
Why Authentication?
More than forty years ago, Die and Hellman agged that authentication was
perhaps the main barrier to the universal adoption of digital communications for
sensitive data (e.g., business transactions) and that it constituted the heart of any
system involving `contracts and billing' [37]. These statements acted as a spring
for the development of (asymmetric) cryptographic tools for user authentication as
well as data authentication, integrity and non-repudiation.
My Ph.D. has authentication as main topic. The real reason for which I chose to
devote these years of my life to studying and (hopefully) contributing to the area
of authentication is that I believe that (public-key) encryption looses large part of
its usefulness if it is not combined with some sort of authentication. For instance,
if I had a sensitive conversation about my health condition, I would rst make sure
that my interlocutor is my doctor {and not some impostor sending fake news to
me{ and only secondly that the conversation is encrypted (thus intelligible only
to the doctor and me). Having reliable and secure authentication has become even
more relevant thanks to the technological development we have witnessed in the last
decades. Nowadays, authentication is a fundamental step in services such as on-
line banking, e-health, e-commerce, automatized border controls and many more.
My Ph.D. goal was therefore to get acquainted with known ways to achieve data
and user authentication, to propose new solutions and to extend existing ones to
collaborative scenarios, where multiple entities want to contribute to a joint cause.
The main results of my work are collected into this Ph.D. thesis.
Thesis Overview
This thesis collects the major results I obtained during my Ph.D. at Chalmers
University of Technology. The title be more and be merry captures the core idea of
my works: guaranteeing that certain cryptographic primitives and protocols remain
secure even in enhanced environments that involve a number of entities larger than
the standard one. This is the case of collaborative scenarios such as team-work
activity or sensor networks.
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The thesis is organized in two parts. The rst part begins with a high-level intro-
duction, some background notions and a brief summary of the results. It concludes
with an outlook on directions for future work. The second part of the thesis is a
collection of six papers on data and user authentication in collaborative settings
including sharing computation on data, taking over specic tasks, or enabling com-
munication. Figure 2 displays connections among the published works I contributed
to during my Ph.D. and groups them by topic.
Distance-Bounding 
Authentication
Digital
Signatures
Biometric
Authentication
[69]
[71]
[73]
[74]
[4]
[67]
Paper E
[68]
Paper F
[70]
Paper C
[72]
Paper B
[40]
Paper A
[39]
Paper D
[86]
Homomorphic
Encryption 
Figure 2: Pie diagram of my publications during the Ph.D. Lines between papers
display logical connections among the results contained therein.
In detail, Paper A [39] and Paper B [40] provide ways for authenticating com-
putations on data generated by multiple users; Paper C [72] investigates how to
improve the eciency and anonymity in settings where the verication of signatures
is ooaded to an untrusted server. Paper D [86] and [69] extend the notion of
distance-bounding to a collaborative setting by relying on an untrusted linker for
authenticating an out-of-reach entity. In the same research area, [73, 74] propose a
new authentication protocol that mitigates known attacks against the HB protocol
[58]. Paper E [68], Paper F [70] and [4, 71] address issues in biometric authen-
tication protocols. Finally, [67] is my most recent work and falls outside the wide
area of authentication. It considers the problem of privacy-preserving processing
of outsourced data in the context of user-customised services and develops a new
lightweight protocol for private and secure storage, computation and disclosure of
users' data.
Background
Cryptography is about communication
in the presence of an adversary.
Goldwasser and Bellare [47]
This section provides high-level and concise introductions to the four main areas of
contributions of this thesis, namely: homomorphic signatures, server-aided verica-
tion, distance bounding authentication and biometric authentication. The reader
is assumed to be familiar with basic concepts of public-key cryptography [47].
Homomorphic Signatures
Digital Signatures [18, 25, 48] enable the holder of a secret key to sign messages
in such a way that anyone in possession of the corresponding public verication
key can determine the validity of a given message-signature pair. For security, it
is required that the signature is unforgeable, i.e., no ecient adversary can forge a
valid signature (unless the adversary knows the secret key).
Consider the use case of a school database for students' grades. To prevent students
from tampering with their results, each teacher uploads a grade together with a
signature (for the student and the grade). The unforgeability property ensures that
students cannot arbitrarily change their grades, however, it also limits the utility of
the database. For instance, if the school director wants to check the average of the
students' grades on a certain subject, she would need to download all the grade-
signature pairs related to the subject, check the authenticity of each grade and
then compute the average on the (now certied) values. This procedure is quite
inconvenient, since the grades need to be checked before computing the average,
and has a high communication cost, due to the fact that all signed data need to be
downloaded. A more desirable solution would allow the school director to download
directly the average grade together with one signature attesting that the returned
value is the correct one according to the grades available in the school database,
and digitally signed by the legitimate teacher (see Figure 3). Such a scheme would
have somehow malleable signatures, i.e., signatures that support computation on
authenticated data. This kind of schemes are called homomorphic signatures.
(grade, signature)
average of grades?
(average, signature)
Figure 3: Application scenario for homomorphic signature schemes: a database of
signed grades.
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Homomorphic signature (HS) schemes [36] enable the holder of a secret key to sign
messages m1; : : : ;mn in such a way that anyone in possession of the corresponding
signatures 1; : : : ; n and a function f can produce a valid signature  for the
message y = f(m1; : : : ;mn). The key property of HS is succinctness: the size of the
evaluated signature  should be smaller than the concatenation (1; : : : ; n) and
it is usually logarithmic in n, the number of messages. In homomorphic settings
the denition of unforgeability depends on the class of functions f supported by
the scheme. For schemes that support only linear functions on a vector space, e.g.,
[16], unforgeability states that the adversary should not be able to derive a correct
signature for a message (vector) which cannot be obtained as a linear combination
of previously honestly signed messages. If we applied the same reasoning to linearly
homomorphic signatures with messages in a eld or to Fully Homomorphic Signature
schemes (FHS), e.g., [15, 49], we would end up with a useless denition: given a
pair (m;) it is possible to generate a valid signature 0 for any message m0 =
f(m). Since f is any polynomial function, from a chosen m and its signature
 one can compute signatures for any message in the whole message space. A
meaningful notion of unforgeability for FHS requires that the adversary should not
be able to derive a valid signature  for a value y that is not the correct output
of f(m1; : : : ;mn) [43, 49]. This notion is achieved thanks to labelled programs
[43], as in FHS the signatures, the homomorphically evaluated signatures and the
verication procedure all depend on the labels.
The unforgeability intuitions given in this section are approximations of the core
meaning of the corresponding security notions. The formal denitions are quite
elaborate and include several sub-cases (types of forgeries). We refer the readers to
[16, 39, 49] for the details.
In the school database scenario, using FHS to sign the grades solves the problem
of computing statistics on the performance of students in each subject. However,
FHS does not directly allow to perform computations on grades signed by dierent
teachers, leaving open the following problem:
How can we authenticate homomorphic computation of functions that
involve data signed by dierent secret keys?
To achieve this property we need to make the signature scheme not only homo-
morphic on the messages, but also `exible' enough to accommodate computations
on data generated by dierent signers. The latter property is often referred to
as multi-key. In Paper A [39], we address the above question and formalize the
multi-key notion for FHS. Moreover, we provide concrete instantiations of schemes
that are multi-key and homomorphic. In Paper B [40] we go one step further and
investigate connections between single-key and multi-key homomorphic signatures.
Server-Aided Verication of Signatures
In the previous section, we mentioned how digital signature schemes have devel-
oped to support more and more advanced homomorphic properties. Computing on
signed data, however, is not the only line of development for signature schemes.
To cover the wide range of applications of this cryptographic primitive, other types
of schemes have been proposed such as: ring signatures [10, 21, 62], group signa-
tures [14, 29, 62, 63], blind signatures [2, 11, 28], attribute-based signatures [53, 65,
79], and structure preserving signatures [1, 63]. Despite the dierent aims, most
signature schemes are designed around strong and well-established cryptographic
assumptions that guarantee security at the cost of eciency, especially in the veri-
cation process of signatures. There are three possible ways to enjoy both security
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and eciency: (i) using a dierent hard problem to design a secure signature scheme,
(ii) trying to speed-up inecient algorithms exploiting clever ways of computing the
necessary data, and (iii) o-loading heavy computations to a third party and e-
ciently verifying the returned result. The latter approach falls into the server-aided
category of cryptographic schemes. Since in signatures schemes the large bulk of
computation is usually in the verication procedure, the main line of research is
for Server-Aided signature Verication (SAV) schemes [31, 45, 83, 85]. The aim of
such schemes is to reduce the gap between the computational cost of the signing
algorithm and the one of the verication algorithm in pairing-based schemes. There
exist also work on server-aided signature generation, however in this case the focus
is not on eciency [8, 56].
Relying on a server to carry out expensive computations is a natural solution in
applications where resource-constrained devices are required to perform computa-
tions above the device capacity. From this point of view, server-aided verication
renders computationally heavy signatures accessible to a wide range of resource-
limited devices (e.g., smartcards, small-battery smartphones) without aecting the
device's performance or battery life. The idea behind this solution is to replace the
verication algorithm of a signature scheme with an interactive protocol between
the computationally weak verier and the computationally powerful but untrusted
server (see Figure 4).
(bid, signature)
accept / reject
compute
Figure 4: Application scenario for server-aided verication: signed auctions.
A bit more formally, SAV exploits the fact that the verication algorithm of any sig-
nature scheme can be split into two parts: a computationally expensive part (that
includes most of the operations performed for the verication) and a lightweight
equality-check part (see Figure 5). The aim is to replace the computationally ex-
pensive part with an interactive protocol that has the same functionality and is
more ecient (at least in terms of computational cost for the delegator-verier).
Involving one more entity in the signature verication introduces new privacy and
security concerns.
Sign(sk,m) → σ
Verify(pk,m,σ) → 0/1
KeyGen(gp) → (pk, sk)
SetUp(1λ) → gp= BilinGroup
pk = gsk, sk ← Zp
= Hash(m)sk
e(σ, g) =? e(Hash(m), pk)
Figure 5: The BLS [17] signature scheme. The expensive computations in the
verication algorithm are highlighted with gray background. SAV schemes aim at
reducing the gap between the computational cost of Sign and Verify.
There have been some attempts to provide a formal security framework for server-
aided verication of signatures [31, 84, 85] and Paper C contributes to this line
by proposing a more realistic security model and new SAV schemes that achieve
stronger notions of security and privacy.
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Distance-Bounding Authentication Protocols
Distance-Bounding Authentication Protocols (DBAP) [5, 20] are two-party interac-
tive protocols that allow one entity (called the prover) to authenticate to a verier
under the following conditions: (1) the prover is legitimate and (2) the prover
lies within a xed radius from the verier. The rst condition is checked using
a challenge-response approach: the verier sends a (usually one-bit) challenge c,
the prover computes the (usually one-bit) response r using a secret key and some
light-weight cryptographic tools. The second condition is checked by equipping
the verier with a clock and measuring the time elapsed between sending c and
receiving r. To prove its proximity to the verier, the prover computes its r im-
mediately after receiving c. To increase accuracy, DBAPs run a series of rapid
challenge-response exchanges between the verier and the prover. Figure 6 depicts
the setting of DBAPs. In a nutshell, distance-bounding authentication protocols
Verifier Prover
c1
c2
cn
r2
r1
rn
.
.
.
Figure 6: Schematic explanation of distance-bounding authentication. The verier
is a terminal for contact-less payments, the prover is a contact-less smartcard.
blend cryptographic primitives with timing tools to achieve accurate authentica-
tion. This dual nature is motivated by real world needs: DBAPs represent the best
mitigation against severe attacks such as the ones described below.
Contact-less debit-cards, credit-cards and smartcards in general were designed to
bring together security and usability. The chip present in contact-less cards is able
to carry out quite sophisticated cryptographic computations once it is brought to
life by a magnetic eld. In order to authorize the card functionality (e.g., small -
nancial transactions) cardholders need to simply wave the card in front of a terminal
machine (e.g., point-of-sale). Within a few seconds the smartcard and the terminal
communicate with each other and determine whether the functionality (e.g., pay-
ment) was successful or not. Unfortunately, the most common contact-less EMV1
payment protocols (Visa's payWave and MasterCard's PayPass) have aws and
have been shown vulnerable to relay attacks [13, 30, 38] that can be performed
even with smartphones [66]. Such attacks may lead to undesirable consequences
including changing the amount being charged or the party to be paid. For instance,
a businessman seated in a cafe with his contact-less credit card `safely' put in his
pocket, may be the victim of an attack where an antenna bridges the communication
between a contact-less terminal in the jewellery shop next to the cafe and the busi-
nessman's card. By relaying the communication through the antenna, the attacker
in the shop may be able to pay the jewellery with the businessman's money! Similar
1EMV stands for Europay, MasterCard, and Visa.
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attacks have been setup to amplify the communication range of RFID car-keys and
unlock cars, while the keys were not in their physical proximity [41].
Relay attacks are a special family of man-in-the-middle attacks where the attacker
bridges communications between two parties (the victims). Concretely, the relay-
attacker is in communication with both parties and merely relays messages between
the victims without manipulating them or even necessarily reading them. What
makes relay attacks so dangerous is that in order to tamper with the protocol
the adversary does not need to know the details of the protocol or to break the
underlying cryptographic functions, it simply relays messages. A quaint example
of relay attack is the little girl playing against two chess masters [33]. All the little
girl needs to do is to challenge two Grandmasters at postal chess and relay moves
between them. Without knowing the rules of the game, the little girl will win (or
have a tie) in one of the two games.
The only way to distinguish a response that is being relayed from one that is
directly sent by the card to the terminal is to measure how long it takes for the
response to reach the terminal. As contact-less communication happens at most
at the speed of light, accurate clocks would be able to detect a time dierence
that corresponds to half a meter space [20]. Therefore, a protocol that combines
light-weight cryptographic functions with physical time measurements represents
the natural solution against relay attacks. The keyed cryptographic functions are
used in a challenge-response framework to authenticate the prover (e.g., a contact-
less smartcard) while the recorded round-trip-times of the communication provide
an upper-bound on the maximal distance between the prover and the verier (e.g.,
contact-less card reader). These are exactly the characteristics of distance-bounding
protocols.
Brands and Chaum's seminal work on distance-bounding [20] was followed by a
long series of proposals [19, 51, 59, 74]. Paper D [86] provides the rst formal
framework to describe the main classes of existing distance-bounding protocols and
also puts forward a general method to extend traditional prover-verier protocols to
the three-participant setting of prover-linker-verier (two-hop distance estimation).
Biometric Authentication Protocols
While distance-bounding protocols authenticate a user (the prover) via a device she
holds, biometric-based authentication relies solely on the user's human features.
Biometric Authentication Protocols (BAP) allow quick, accurate and user-friendly
authentication of people. In a nutshell, all you need to do is to provide the system
with one biometric trait (e.g., your ngerprint or iris scan) and from that point
on the system is able to recognize you. In general, biometric traits are distinctive
characteristics that are measurable and identify (almost) uniquely each individual.
Therefore by measuring a fresh biometric template and comparing it with a refer-
ence, the system can recognize people and reject impostors claiming to be someone
they are not. Common biometric credentials are: ngerprint [88], iris [35], and face
shape [78].
Figure 7 provides a high-level intuition of the main aspects of biometric authen-
tication. To give a concrete example, consider an access gate to a military facility.
The gate is equipped with a sensor that scans the soldiers' iris. The iris scan
transforms the biometric trait into a digital credential that is compared to a stored
biometric template for the soldier. Access will be granted only after the person has
been recognized as an authorized soldier in the military facility.
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Figure 7: Schematic explanation of how biometric authentication works. The user
provides a biometric trait and an identity. The sensor extracts from the trait a
biometric template b0 for identity ID. The system retrieves the reference template
b corresponding to ID and performs a matching process. If b is close enough to b0
(i.e.,  is small) the user is accepted, otherwise she is rejected.
Biometric authentication has become popular thanks to its usability and user-
dependent nature, properties that cannot be achieved with classical authentication
methods (e.g., passwords, distance-bounding). In particular, biometric authenti-
cation removes the need for users to memorize complicated, long passwords or to
carry along special secret tokens. Moreover, biometric credentials are characteris-
tic features naturally bound to the user's body, are hard to steal, reproduce and
to spoof [7, 80]. This very same advantageous property, however, raises serious
security and privacy concerns in the case of a biometric trait being compromised
(cloned, forged).
Unlike passwords or tokens, biometric credentials cannot be kept secret or hidden,
and stolen biometrics cannot be revoked as easily [3]. Compromised biometric
credentials have an even stronger impact than spoofed passwords or stolen tokens.
With a stolen biometric credential attackers can perform crimes such as identity
theft and individual proling and tracking [71, 80]. Moreover, from stolen biometrics
traits one can learn sensitive information about the owners, including ethnicity,
genetic information [75], medical diseases [12] and can use these data to compromise
health records [54].
Motivated by the high sensitivity of biometric data, in the past years several
privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocols have been proposed [7, 82,
87]. Such protocols are designed to resist specic attack scenarios including the
biometric reference recovery attack. In this attack, an unauthorized entity tries to
recover the (plaintext) reference biometric template b for a target user ID. A success-
ful reference recovery attack has particularly harmful consequences: the knowledge
of the raw credential b gives unauthorized access to any system that uses b as the
reference template for user ID and may additionally leak sensitive information about
the user's physical characteristics and genetics.
Privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocols make use of advanced cryp-
tographic techniques (such as Oblivious Transfer and Homomorphic Encryption)
and are based on a distributed setting, where several entities take part in the pro-
tocol. The main reason for this approach is to minimize the amount of information
known by each entity.
In Paper E [68] we generalize Abidin, Pagnin and Mitrokotsa's biometric refer-
ence recovery attack [3] to a wider family of BAPs and investigate the leakage of
information that aects biometric authentication. In Paper F [70] we show how
to mitigate Abidin's attack [3] using Veriable Computation techniques.
Summary of Papers and Contributions
We hope this will inspire others to work in this
fascinating area in which participation has been
discouraged in the recent past by a nearly total
government monopoly.
Die and Hellman, 1976 [37]
This section provides an overview of the main results of the papers included in Part
II of this thesis. It also contains descriptions of my contributions to each work.
Multi-Key Homomorphic Authenticators
Problem statement and related work. Homomorphic authenticators enable
a client to authenticate a large collection of data in such a way that any third party
can generate a short authenticator vouching for the correctness of the output of
some computation on the data and the authenticators. Previous works proposed
Homomorphic signatures or homomorphic MAC schemes that could support com-
putations of linear functions [16] or of more expressive polynomials [15, 49]. All
the aforementioned schemes are however single-key, i.e., computations can only be
performed on data generated with a single secret key. This characteristic limits the
application range of homomorphic authenticators to non-collaborative settings as
it prevents the correct authentication of any computation that requires input from
entities with dierent secret keys.
Consider the earlier example of a school database. Homomorphic signatures en-
able teachers to upload signed grades and anyone else (e.g., the school director or
the students' parents) to check for the authenticity of simple statistics on the grades.
Unforgeability ensures that the students cannot upload fake grades. Homomorphic
signatures schemes, however, do not directly support authenticated statistics on
grades generated with dierent secret keys. In particular, in our example it would
not be possible to authenticate the outcome of computations that involve grades
by dierent teachers. To achieve this property, the signature scheme would need to
be homomorphic even among messages signed with dierent secret keys, in other
words, be multi-key and homomorphic.
Contributions and their implications. In this paper, we introduce the no-
tion of Multi-Key Homomorphic Authenticators (MK-HAs), a reasonable security
model for this new primitive and two independent constructions. MK-HAs extend
the existing notions of Homomorphic Signatures and Homomorphic Message Au-
thentication Codes to support computations on data generated by dierent secret
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keys while relying on succinct authenticators, i.e., the size of the authenticators
depends at most logarithmically on the total number of inputs to the computation.
Our Multi-Key HS scheme is based on standard lattices and supports the evalu-
ation of circuits of bounded polynomial depth. Our construction of a Multi-Key
Homomorphic MAC is particularly ecient, it is based on pseudorandom functions
and supports the evaluation of low-degree arithmetic circuits.
Statement of contributions. This paper is the result of a collaboration be-
tween Dario Fiore, Luca Nizzardo, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa and myself. We developed
and formalized the new primitive and its security model during my visit at IMDEA
funded by CryptoAction. I mainly worked on the Multi-Key Homomorphic MAC
construction and its security proofs. In addition, I proposed adding the Z compo-
nent to the signatures of the Multi-Key HS scheme to mitigate a special family of
forgeries.
Matrioska: A Compiler for Multi-Key Homomorphic Signa-
tures
Problem statement and related work. This paper is a follow-up of our work
on multi-key homomorphic authenticators [39]. Existing multi-key homomorphic
signature schemes are ad-hoc adaptations of a single-key homomorphic signature
[39] or derived by a generic construction that exploits strong, non-falsiable cryp-
tographic primitives such as SNARKs [60]. In particular, there is no formal study
on the connections between multi-key and single-key HS schemes. This papers lls
this gap and provides a generic compiler for constructing a secure multi-key variant
of any (suciently expressive) single-key homomorphic signature scheme.
Contributions and their implications. In this paper, we establish formal
connections between multi-key and single-key homomorphic signatures and build
a (theoretical) bridge between these two primitives. In more details, we propose
Matrioska: the rst generic compiler that enhances any (suciently expressive)
single-key HS with multi-key features under standard falsiable assumptions only.
The existence of this compiler implies that multi-key and single-key homomorphic
signatures are equivalent (if they support evaluations of a special class of functions).
Moreover, Matrioska can be used to dene new multi-key HS schemes from any fu-
ture proposal of a single-key homomorphic signature. The core of the Matrioska
technique is to use the single-key homomorphic evaluation procedure in an original
way that allows us to derive t signatures vouching for the authenticity of computa-
tions on an arbitrary number of signatures from t dierent signers. Our approach
is completely dierent from the known ways to obtain multi-key HS schemes [39, 60].
Statement of contributions. This paper is the outcome of a joint work be-
tween Dario Fiore and myself. It is a natural follow-up to our paper on multi-key
homomorphic authenticators [39] and dives in understanding the relation between
single- and multi-key homomorphic signatures. My contribution in this work was to
come up with the technical details that made the idea work correctly and securely.
All authors contributed equally to the paper.
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Anonymous Server-Aided Verication of Signatures
Problem statement and related work. Since the introduction of server-
aided verication of signatures [8, 45, 64] there has been a constant development
towards more ecient schemes and more realistic security models. The basic secu-
rity notions for SAV are soundness and existential unforgeability [45]. Wu et al. [85]
address for the rst time attack scenarios where a malicious signer colludes with the
server in order to tamper with the outcome of the server-aided verication. Chow
et al. [31] rene previous denitions and show that the enabler of many attacks to
previous SAV schemes is the absence of an integrity check on the results returned
by the server. Integrity is not the only concern when outsourcing computations:
how about the signer's privacy?
Contributions and their implications. In this paper, we provide formal def-
initions for known and new realistic attack scenarios against server-aided verica-
tion of signatures and propose three novel constructions of server-aided verication
schemes. Concretely, we present the rst compiler that denes a single-round (give-
and-take) server-aided verication protocol for any signature given an appropriate
veriable computation scheme. We make use of our compiler to dene new SAV
schemes that are the rst published proposals achieving existential unforgeability
and soundness against collusion simultaneously.
In addition, we are the rst to consider the notions of signer anonymity and ex-
tended existential unforgeability for SAV. To give an idea on the importance of these
two attack scenarios consider the case of signed auctions, where bidders sign their
bids (messages) to avoid other people impersonating them. In this setting, signer
anonymity prevents a malicious server from distinguishing one signer from another.
As a consequence, the server cannot `keep out' target bidders from the auction by
making their signatures appear invalid. We also provide an extension to the notion
of unforgeability that additionally captures the following attack scenario. Imagine
the adversary is a bidder taking part in the auction. In order to steer the price of
certain items the adversary could get control over the server used for the aided veri-
cation and prevent signatures of higher bids from verifying correctly. Our compiler
allows us to determine sucient requirements on the signature scheme (and/or the
veriable computation scheme) in order to achieve security and anonymity.
Statement of contributions. This paper is the result of a study on server-
aided verication of signatures started by Aiketerini Mitrokotsa and myself during
a visit at Keisuke Tanaka Sensei's laboratory. Although Dario Fiore is not listed
among the authors, he provided me with important technical feedback on the work.
I am the main author of this work and developed all the results. This paper is
of special importance within my Ph.D. because it represents my `rst step' as an
independent researcher on the academic path.
Two-hop Distance-Bounding Protocols: Keep your Friends
Close
Problem statement and related work. Traditional distance-bounding au-
thentication protocols aim to authenticate a resource-constrained prover to a (more
powerful) verier [20, 51, 59, 73, 74], assuming that the prover lies within the com-
munication range of the verier. Albeit most DBAPs are designed for RFID tags,
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there are works that consider slightly more powerful provers and dene public-key
privacy-preserving distance-bounding [42, 52] and group distance-bounding [26].
The common factor to all protocols, however, remains that authentication is sub-
jected to the location of the parties: all devices must lie within each others' trans-
mission range. While this requirement represents the main motivation for adopting
distance-bounding authentication protocols as a countermeasure against relay at-
tacks, it also limits their application scenarios. In particular, it is hard to directly
employ traditional distance-bounding protocols in multiple access control scenar-
ios, in ubiquitous computing environments and even to verify the proximity of a
two-hop neighbor. Pagnin et al. [69] put forward the idea to extend DBAPs to two-
hop neighbors, that is, when the prover and the verier communicate through an
in-between linker. However, a formal framework for constructing two-hop distance-
bounding authentication from traditional DBAPs was missing.
Contributions and their implications. In this paper, we extend traditional
distance-bounding authentication protocols to also authenticate two-hop neighbors,
instead of adjacent devices only. This setting covers environments where the prover
is out of the communication range of the verier, but both parties lie in the prox-
imity of the same untrusted entity, called the linker. We present an intuitive tax-
onomy of existing DBAPs and provide the rst formal framework to extend any
register-based protocol to additionally support the two-hop distance-bounding au-
thentication. We also identify connections between attacks against the two-hop and
the one-hop settings and implement ve two-hop distance-bounding authentication
protocols derived from the proposals in [19, 20, 59, 77] using our framework. Our
experimental results demonstrate the correctness of our security analysis and the
eciency of our model.
Statement of contributions. This paper is the result of a collaboration started
within the objective of a STINT grant awarded to Aikaterini Mitrokotsa and Ger-
hard Hancke. Anjia Yang is the rst author, I am the corresponding author. My
contributions in this work include the proposal of the taxonomy of existing distance-
bounding authentication protocols, the development of the formalism and the de-
scription of the framework for generic extension of register-based DBAP to the
two-hop setting. Additionally, I performed the formal security analysis.
On the Leakage of Information in Biometric Authentication
Problem statement and related work. User authentication via biometric cre-
dentials has become an increasingly popular way to authenticate people in highly
sensitive services such as health care systems [34], but also in everyday tasks such
as smartphone unlocking. If not implemented correctly, the wide adoption of these
systems might raise severe concerns about the users' privacy and security. Privacy-
preserving biometric authentication protocols are designed to mitigate dangerous
threats including individual proling, user tracking and leakage of sensitive informa-
tion connected to biometric traits (e.g., healthcare data [22, 23, 57]). The current
framework for analyzing template security and privacy models distributed biometric
authentication systems with internal adversaries [80]. Among the described attacks
there is also the so-called center search attack.
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Contributions and their implications. In this paper, we provide a formal
mathematical framework to analyze the implications of center search attacks against
privacy-preserving biometric authentication systems. The standard center search
attack is dened on binary strings. In this work, we generalize this ecient hill-
climbing technique to vectors with components in Zq for q  2. As a consequence,
certain families of biometric authentication protocols become naturally vulnerable
to our biometric template recovery attack. The main implication of our attack is
that, if successful, it will let the adversary learn susceptible users' private data that
can lead to disclosure of health condition and digital impersonation of the victim.
However, not all is lost: one of the starting conditions for the attack to work is
the knowledge of a biometric credential that is close enough to the target one. We
investigated how to get such credentials in a theoretical way and showed that such
a problem is equivalent to the set-covering problem which is known to be NP com-
plete [32].
Statement of contributions. This work builds on a previous result by Abidin,
Pagnin and Mitrokotsa [4] and has been developed by me, Christos Dimitrakakis,
Aysajan Abidin and Aikaterini Mitrokotsa. I am the main author of this paper. I
developed the way to generalize Abidin's attack to a larger setting, all the formal
details and the proofs.
Revisiting Yasuda et al.'s Biometric Authentication Protocol:
Are you Private Enough?
Problem statement and related work. Abidin, Pagnin and Mitrokotsa [4]
showed that Yasuda et al.'s privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocol
[87] is vulnerable to an ad-hoc biometric template recovery attack, and thus can no
longer be considered fully privacy-preserving. Among the enablers of Abidin's at-
tack is the fact that the attacker is a malicious computational server. In this paper,
we redeem Yasuda's protocol and propose a mitigation to the aforementioned attack.
Contributions and their implications. In this paper, we put forward a
generic strategy to transform privacy-preserving BAPs that are secure in the honest-
but-curious model into schemes that can tolerate internal malicious attackers. The
stronger security guarantee is derived by employing veriable computation tech-
niques during the matching process. Specically, we dene BFR+ SHE, a biometric
authentication protocol that essentially augments Yasuda et al.'s proposal [87] with
Backes et al.'s veriable computation scheme [6] and is no longer vulnerable to
Abidin's attack [4].
We remark that, BFR+ SHE is still aected by the unavoidable leakage of in-
formation inherent to BAPs that employ the Hamming distance in the matching
process [68]. However, for the leakage to actually happen, the adversary needs to
already hold a matching template, and [68] shows that from a theoretical point of
view nding a matching biometric template is an NP-hard problem.
Statement of contributions. This paper is the outcome of Jing Liu's successful
master thesis project under the supervision of Aikaterini Mitrokotsa and myself. I
contributed with constant support for technical matters during the development of
the master thesis and shaped up the results into a publishable paper.

Conclusions and Outlook
Our research isn't nished and much is left to do
For instance, proving theorems completely in haiku
Trotta Gnam [46]
This Ph.D. thesis contributes to the body of knowledge in data and user authenti-
cation. It provides high-level explanations of four authentication methods and six
state-of-the-art papers that investigate homomorphic signatures, server-aided sig-
nature verication, distance-bounding authentication and biometric authentication.
This thesis brings in new constructions and aims to inspire further research.
Among the directions for future investigation that stem from the contributions
of this thesis we highlight the following. Paper A and Paper B show how to
construct multi-key homomorphic authenticators, but do not aim to give succinct
instantiations. Constructing multi-key schemes with authenticators of size indepen-
dent of the number of users involved in the computation is an open challenge, if one
does not want to rely on strong cryptographic tools that are likely to be based on
non-falsiable assumptions (e.g., SNARKs as proposed in [60]). Other directions
of research in this area include: combining authentication and condentiality so
that the entity who runs the homomorphic evaluation (e.g., the cloud) does not
learn the data over which it computes; and developing context-hiding schemes that
achieve privacy by revealing no non-trivial information about the computations'
inputs. Paper C raises awareness about the need for more ecient veriable com-
putation schemes for bilinear-pairing evaluation that would render a wide range of
signature schemes accessible to resource-limited devices via server-aided verica-
tion techniques. Paper D opens up a new scene for distance-bounding authentica-
tion and therefore calls for creative application scenarios in two-hop and multi-hop
settings. Finally, Paper E and Paper F address privacy concerns in biometric
authentication and identify the need for new tools to achieve non-leaky biometric
template matching.
In addition to the six papers collected in Part II, during my Ph.D. I had several
successful collaborations that resulted in the publications reported in the List of
Publications at the beginning of this thesis. Figure 8 provides subway map in-
spired representation of my research work so far. Papers are represented as stations,
and the four lines follow the paths of data/user privacy privacy, multi-key features,
constrained settings and new attacks. The two, black, right-most stations in Figure
8 are outlooks of two on-going works that I describe in what follows.
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Figure 8: A subway-style map of the papers I contributed to during my Ph.D. The
works are organized by the time of publication (or due date) on the x axis, and
the size of the supported collaborative setting on the y axis (starting from two
users and increasing progressively). Connections between papers are represented as
`subway lines' between `stations'. The lines are named after the four main themes
of my Ph.D. The Latin letters A-F refer to the corresponding papers appended to
this thesis. Dashed lines lead to results currently under development and highlight
directions for future work.
Paper Succinct MKHE in Figure 8 puts forward an original way to achieve fully
succinct ciphertexts in multi-key additive homomorphic encryption. Exploiting the
algebraic structure of some additive homomorphic encryption schemes, we dene a
new encryption scheme that is a hybrid of secret-key and public-key mechanisms.
Our objective is to develop a scheme that supports linearly homomorphic compu-
tations on data encrypted by dierent users and has ciphertexts of constant-length.
Paper Signal+ investigates how to obtain secure asynchronous messaging under the
presence of very powerful adversaries. The starting point is the widely deployed
Signal protocol. We identify some weaknesses in the design of Signal and propose
mitigations and improvements. Our two major goals are to change the trust as-
sumptions of the Signal protocol and to develop a new approach to the ratchet
mechanism that supports persistent entity authentication (partnering).
To conclude, I hope this thesis presents a pleasant tour in the land of data and
user authentication. Authentication is only one side of the complex polyhedron of
security goals in the cryptography world. I am condent that the authentication
protocols and schemes we have now and will develop in the future will allow us
to happily and safely collaborate in this digital Era even under the presence of
malicious entities. Thus, I wish you all to be more and be merry!
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